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[Crim. No. 7213. In Bank. Dec. 3, 1963.]

In re PAUL KERN IMBLER on Habeas Corpus.
[1] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Evidence-Knowing Use of Perjured TestimonY.-A judglllellt of conviction based on testimony known by representatives of the state to be perjured
deprives defendant of due process of law and lllay be attacked on habeas corpus. --[2] Id.-Hearing-Burden of Proof.-In attacking on habeas
corpus a jUdgment of conviction allegedly ba5ed on testimony known by state representatives to be perjured, petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
perjured testimony was adduced at his trial, that representatives of the state knew that it was perjured, and that such
testimony lllay have affected the outcome of the trial.
[3] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On a rrference hearing of a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that petitioner was convicted on the basis of perjured testimony knowingly used by
the state, the pertinent inquiry is whether the witness testified at the trial contrary to his belief at that time; that the
witness, who identified petitioner at the preliminary hearing
and at the trial, testified at the reference hearing that he could
not then idf'ntify petitioner as the one who cOllllllitted the
crime does not show perjury, but merely that the witness
changed his mind.
[4] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On petition for habeas corpus on
thl' ground that a petitioner's conviction was obtained by the
(1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 38; Am.Jur., Habeas Corpus (1st ('Ii § 53).
McK. Dig. References: [1, 6-9, 13, 14] Haheas Corpus, § 26;
[2] Habeas Corpus, § 60; [3-5,10,12,16] Habeas Corpus, § 62.1;
[11] Criminal Law, § 104; [HiJ Criminal Law, § 602; [17] Criminal L.,w, § 1038(6); [18J Crilllinal Law, § 1038(1); [19] CrimiPlil Law, § 107; [20] Habens Corpu!';, § 11.
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knowing use of perjured testimony, dt'spite a witness' claim
at the habeas corpus rCferE'llCe hearing that he always had
grave doubts about his identification of petitioner, a finding
that the witness had neither before the trial nor after expressed to a stntc representative doubt as to his identification
was supported by evidence that more than a year after the tI'ial
and several months before the reference hearing the witness
stated to police officers that he had had no doubt as to his identification at the time of the trial and had not perjured hilllself,
and by testiIllony and ailidlwits of police offic<!rs and lIlt'll\bers of the district attorncy's staff denying that the wituess
had expressed to them any doubt about his identifieatiun
testimony.
[5] Id.-Hearing-Evidence.-On a reference hearing of .a petition for habeas corpus on thc ground that a conviction was obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony, there W!1S
support for a finding that the witness who allegedly gave
the perjured tcstimony was not induced by any l't'presentative of the state to make a false identification of defendllllt
by being shown photographs of defendant many times before the lineup at which defendant was identified where the
evideuc.e showed that the witness was confused about the
time when he saw defendant's photograph and the form of
the photograph, it appearing that the photograph was not
shown to the wHlll'ss until after he had described defl'ndant
while helping the police make a eomposite drawing of the
persoll suspected of committing the crime.
[6a, 6b] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony.-Although a witness testified on cross-examination
that he had only one prior felony conviction, whereas his
"make sheet" showed that he had two felony convictions, and
on redirect, to rehabilitate himself after cross-examination·
about his commitment to state mental hospitals, testificd
falsely that he had received dcgrees from two universities,
such false statements did not require that defendant's conviction be overturned on habeas corpus where there was no
proof that representatives of the state had knowledge of the
falsehoods.
[7] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of False Testimony.False testimony affecting a witness' credibility is perjured
if willfully given, and such testimony would require that a
conviction be overturned if representatives of the state had
knowledge of its false nature and if it might have affected the
outeome. of the trial.
[8a,8b] Id.-Grounds-Evidence--Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony.-Thnt a fingerprint expert testified incorrectly at
defendant's trial as to the numbcl' of fingerprints on a razor
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calle and their sulliciency for idcntilication purposes did not
require that defendnnt's cOllviction be ovcrthrown on habeas
corpus where thcre was no indication that the cxpert intl>ntionally gave false testimony; honest error in expl'rt opiniou
is not perjury even though furthcr diligencc nnd study might
have revealed the error.
[9] Id.-Grounds-Evidence-Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony.-If any representative of the state connected with a
prosecution either gives perjured testimony or knows that
other prosecution witnesses have pcrjured themselves, a
writ of habeas corpus will issue. It is immaterinl that the
prosecutor himself did not have knowledge of the perjury.
(10} Id.-Rearing-Evidence.-In a habeas corpus proceeding
on the ground that a conviction was obtained by the knowing
use of perjured testimony, even nssuming that a fingerprint
expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints on a razor
case and in testifying that they were too fragmentary to
identify, there was no basis for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus where the razor case nnd the fingerprints on
it were available to defendant throughout the trial for his
own examination, where proof that someone else handled the
case would not have absolved defendant or conflicted with
the evidence against him, and where the testimony of the
expert did not interfere with the presentation of defendant's
defense.
[11] Criminal Law-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial.-Suppression
by the state of material evwence alone deprives a defendant
of due process of law.
[12] Rabeas Corpus-Rearing-Evidence.-On a reference hearing of a petition for habeas corpus on the ground that a
conviction was obtained by the knowing use of perjured testimony, a clnim that the police prevented the appearnnce at
the trial of a witness favorable to defendant was not supported by the evidence where it appeared that unusual diligence was exercised by representatives of the state to procure
the attendance of the witness, that at the time of the trial
the police testified that they were unable to locate the witness
after a thorough search, and that the assumption that the
witness would have been favorable to defendant was doubtful
in light of a card signed by the witness at a police lineup
identifying defendant as the person who committed the crime.
[13] Id.-Grounds-Evidence-Suppression of Evidence.-Suppression of the fact that a coemployee of defendant was unable to identify the coat dropped by the person who committed the crime was not sufficient to require that defendant's
conviction be overturned on habeas corpus where the failure
to identify the coat was merely one of mnny fruitless attempts to connect defendant with the physical evidence in
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the case j evidence of such failures would have been merely
negative evidence of little probative value and could not
have affected the outcome of the case.
[14] ld.-Grounds-Evidence-Suppression of Evidence.-Suppression of the fact that investigating police knew that a witness
against defendant had issued several checks that were returned between the commi5sion of the crime charged against
defendant and the trial did not require that defendant's conviction be overturned on habeas corpus where it appeared
that the police did not consider the information significant,
no charges were made or proposed because of the issuance
of the checks, and neither before nor at the trial did defendant request diseovery of such evidence.
[15] Criminal Law-Conduct of Counsel-Reception of EvidenceSuppression of Evidence.-Although representatives of the
state may not suppress substantial material evidence, they
are under no duty to report sua sponte to defendant all that
they learn about the case and about their witnesses.
[16] Habeas Corpus-Hearing-Evidence.-In a habeas corpus
proceeding, new evidence presented to the referee, including
testimony at the reference hearing by a prosecution witness
at the trial that defendant was not the man he chased after
the crime and the presentation at the reference hearing of
several witnesses who corroborated defendant's alibi defenses,
did not undermine the prosecution's entire case against defendant where it did not point unerringly to defendant's
innocence, but presented only a conflict with the evidence
that was before the jury and afforded only a basis for specu-:
lation or conjecture.
'
[17] Criminal Law-Judgment-Writ of Error Coram Vobis.-The
writ of coram vobis is essentially identical to the writ of coram
nobis except that the latter is addressed to the court in which
the petitioner was convictl'd.
[18] ld.-Judgment-Writ of Error Coram Vobis.-Wl'its of coram 'l'obis and coram nobis will be granted only if petitioner
can show that some fact existed which, without any fault or
negligence on his part, was not presented to the court at the
trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the judgment.
[19] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-Defendant was
not denied adequate representation by counsel on the ground
that there was an absence of an effective investigation in hiE
[17] See Cal.Jur.2d, Coram ~obis, § 2.
[19] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 et seq.; Am.Jur., Crim,
inal Law (1st ed § 167 et seq).
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behalf, despite the fact that an iuvestigation after the trial
by the Adult Authority and the district attorney's staff turned
up additional alibi witnesses the defense had been unable to
find, where the services of the public defender's investigative
staff were available to defendant and an investigator worked
on the case, and where defense counsel did not indicate during the trial that additional investigative services were needed or ask for additional time to conduct an investigation.
Whatever may be the scope of the right to adequate and effective investigation, it does not require that the investigation
produce all evidence that can be shown by hindsight to have
been available.
[20] Habeas Corpus-Grounds-Errors and Irregularities.-On a
reference hearing of a petition for habeas corpus to secure
release from custody after a conviction of first degree murder, the petitioner could not successfully claim that the trial
judge erred in informing the jury, in response to a juror's
question, of petitioner's right to an automatic appeal to the
Supreme Court in the event they should impose a death penalty, and in failing to admonish the jury of their sole responsibility for imposing sentence and to explain to them
the nature and scope of the Supreme Court's review, where
the jury were informed of the automatic appeul only after
consent of both parties had been obtained, and objection to
the judge's statelllent was not raised eithl'r at the trial or on
the appeal.

PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure rE'leasE' from cus- I
tody, or for a writ of error coram vobis, or other appropriate I
rE'lief. Order to show cause dischargE'd and petition denied. I
Gregory S. Stout, Charles Hollopeter, Warren hEttinger,
Albert C. Garber, Ellery E. Cuff, Public DefE'nder (Los
Angeles), Richard S. Buckley, De~uty Public Defender,
Jules C. Goldstone and Low & Stone for Petitioner.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, John S. McInerny and
AlbE'rt \V. Harris, Jr., Deputy Attorneys General, \Villiam B.
MeKpsson, District Attorney (Los Angeles), and Harry
Wood, Deputy District Attorney, for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Petitioner was convicted of first degree
JIlurder and of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to
commit murder. The jury fixed his penalty a~ death. This
court affirmed the judgment and an order denying a motion
for new trial. (People v. Imble.r, 57 Cal.2d 711 [21 Cal.Rptr.
56R, 371 P.~d 304].) In this proceeding, pet.itioner s('eks a
writ of habeas corpus, coram vobis, or other appropriate
relief.

}
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On January 4, 1961, two men entered a I,os Angeles
market, one of them shot and fatally wounded Morris Hasson, the proprietor, and they departed in different directions.
The only eyewitness to the crime, Hasson's wife, was unable
to identify the man who did the shooting, but later identified
his accomplice. A passerby, Alfred Costello, ran toward the
market when he heard the shot, and at the lighted entrance
t'l1countered a man leaving the store with a gun in his lland. I
Costello chased the killer through several parking lots adja- i
cent to the store; the killer shot at Costello and dropped llis :
hat aIH} coat while making his escape. A pistol, later identified as the murder weapon, a razor in a plastic ease, and a
soiled hanclerchief were in the coat.
Entirely ou the basis of the idelltifieation testimony of several witnesses, petitioner was cOllvicted of murdering Hasson
in the perpetration of an armed robbery and of assault with
intent to murder Costello. All attempts to tie the physical
evidence at the scene of the murder to petitioner were
fruitless, and a police expert testified that fingerprints ou the
murder weapon and on the razor and its case were too fragmentary to assign to anyone. Petitioner was identified as the
man who left the store with a gun by Costello, who had seen
the killer at the entrance of the store and again during the,
chase, by Billy Hillen, who was leaving the store as the two:
men entered and who testified that he had clearly seen them
again as they left, and by Alonzo Duulap, who was an
attendant at one of the parking lots through which the killer
escaped. Hillen and Mrs. Hasson identified the other man at
the killing as Leonard Lingo, an accomplice of petitioner in
an attempted robbery in Pomona on January 14, 1961. During this January 14 attempt, Lingo was killed and another
accomplice, Jerry Mayes, was captured. On January 15,
Imbler surrendered to the Pomona police.
Petitioner testified that he first met Lingo, whose identity
as the accomplice of the killer was not disputed, on the morning of January 14 and that he spent thc evening of January
4 with several other persons in various Los Angeles bars.
Both alibis were corroborated by Mayes, his accomplice in the
January 14 robbery attempt.
The petition allE'gE's that the prosecution secured petitioner's conviction through the knowing use of perjured testimony and that newly discovered evidence completely undermines the entire strueture of the ease 011 which the prosecution was based. After examining the petition and the affida-
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vits attached to it, wc issued an order to show cause and
appointed the Honorable Thomas P. 'Yhite, retired Associate
Justice of this court, as referee to take evidl'nce directed to
the following questions:
"1. Did any witness who testified against Paul Kern
Imbler in thc trial which r('sult('d in the judgment of conviction, affirmed by this court in People v. Imbler, 57 A.C. 757
[57 Ca1.2d 711 (2 Cal.Rptr. 568, 371 P.2d 304)], commit
perjury as defined in the Pellal Code of the State of California T
"2. In the event that any witness did commit perjury, did
any representative of the State of California cause or sutler
such testimony to be introduced, knowing such testimony as
given was perjured!
,. 3. Did any representative of the State of California suppress or prevent the introduction of any evidence which, had
it been given, would have been favorable to the defense of
Paul Kern Imbler!
"4. What if any ncw evidence has been discovered that
undermines the case presented by the prosecution at the time
of the judgment of conviction of Paul Kern Imbler Y"
[1] A judgment of conviction based on testimony known
by representatives of the state to be perjured deprives the
defendant of due process of la,v (Mooney v. Holohan, 294
U.S. 103, 112-113 [55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R.
406] ; Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (63 S.Ct. 177, 87
L.Ed. 214]) and may be attacked on habeas corpus (In re
Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1, 15 [73 P.2d 554]; In re Lindley, 29
Ca1.2d 709, 722 [177 P.2d 918] ; In re Horowitz, 33 Ca1.2d
534, 537 [203 P.2d 513]). [2] In making such an attack,
. however, petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that perjured testimony was adduced at his trial,
that representatives of the state knew that it was perjured
(In re Mooney, supra, at p. 15; In re Lindley, supra, at p.
722), and that such testimony may have affected the outcome
of the trial (Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 272 [79 S.Ct.
1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1222-1223]; see In re De La Roi, 27
Ca1.2d 354, 365 [164 P.2d 10] ; In re Mitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849,
R56 [221 P.2d 689]).
[3] Petitioner alleges several instances of knowing use of
perjured trstimollY. He first attacks Costello's identification
t('stimony. At the preliminary hearing and at the trial, Costello identified petitioner as the man he ehased, but when asked
at the reference hearing if petitioner was that man, he testi-
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fied that" at this time I will have to say no." This change in
testimony alone does not constitute perjury, but merely indicates that Costello changed his mind. The pertinent inquiry
is whether he testified at the trial contrary to his belief at
that time. (See People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 134137 [52 P. 155].)
[4] More than a year after the trial and several months
before the reference hearing, Costello was interviewed by the
police. A tape recording of that interview (the accuracy of
which was challenged by Costello) disclosed that when asked
if he had any doubts about his identification of petitioner at
the trial, he answered: "No at that time there was no doubt .
. .. I'm not worried about pcrjury because I don't think I
perjured myself. I answered the question to the best of my
knowledge and recollection." At the hearing, however, Costello claimed that he always had grave doubts about his identification. The referee found that he "testified of his own free
will as to such identification based upon his own knowledge
as disclosed by his tE'stimony at both the preliminary examination and the trial of Petitioner in the Superior Court."
At the reference hearing, Costello also testified that he had
told the police that he was extremely reluctant to testify
because of his doubts, but that they had forced him to testify
by holding some bad check charges over him. This charge was
categorically denied by the police officers involved although,
they admitted having knowledge of several outstanding bad .
checks issued by Costello and of his previous convictions for
issuing such checks. The referee found that the record "reflects definitrly that 110 threats of any character were made to
Costello with regard to the aforesaid worthless checks." Costello also testified that he had expressed doubt ahout his
identification, both before and after the trial, to at least 16
state officials, including members of the Los Ang-rles Police
Department, members of the Vernon Police Department,
members of the staff of the Los Angeles District Attorney,
and two judges of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Testimony and affidaYits from these persons uniformly denied that Costello expressed such doubts to them.
In fact, some of them stated that he seE'med quite certain and
unshakable in his identification of petitioner. The prosecuting attorney and a police officer testified that they talhd to
Costello before he testified at the trial to impress upon him
the seriousness of his identification and to tell him that thl're
would be no disgrace in withdrawing it if he were unsure.
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Costello replied: " 'I'm positiw. I know it's serious to be
wrong. I haye b('cn c011\'iet('<1 lIIysl'lf of a felony, so I know
how serious it is. I'm pt\siti\'e in my identification.'" The
referee found "that at 110 time dthcr before or after the trial
of Petitioner Imbler on the charge of murder, which resulted
in his eonviction, did the witness .Alfred Costello express to
any repr('s(,lltative of the State of California a doubt as to
his identification of Petitioner Imbler as testified by the
witness Costello."
We adopt both of these findings involving Costello's all('gedly perjured identification. Although we are not bound h.v
the findings of a referee (In re Mooney, 10 Ca1.2d 1, 17 [73
P.2d 554]), they are entitled to great weight (In re Riddle,
57 Ca1.2d 848, 853 [22 Cal. Rptr. 472, 372 P.2d 304] ; In re
ltlartinez, 52 Ca1.2d 808, 812 [345 P.2d 449] ; In re Mitchell,
35 Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689]). After a full hearing, the
referee disbelieved most, if not all, of the ehallgrs that Co!'!tello made in Ilis trial testimony and the charges he made at
the reft'rencl' lll'aring. He found "that the testimony given
by said Alfred J. Costello at the Reference Hearing, which
\'8ri('<1 from his t('stimony at the murder trial, was thoron~h1;V impeached and discredited by numerous witnesses, wlli1e
the t('stimoll~' of said Alfred J. Costello, as given at the 1111ll"der trial coneerning his identification of Petitioner is corroborated by the testimony of witnesses Billy Hillen and
Alonzo Duulap. and is consistent ,vith other circumstances in
thl' (·ast' .... " The referee had the opportunity to obs('rw t},('
witness and judge his credibility and demeanor. (Se>e In TC
Dc La Roi, 27 Cal.2d 354, 364 [164 P.2d 10] ; In re Mart·ir!>,
27 Ca1.2d 503, 516 [165 P.2d 241].) The transcript of the
)waring rewals many ambiguities and inconsistencies in Cnstello's testimony that convince us that the referee was fully
justified in making this finding.
[5] Petitioner alleges that Costello perjured himse 1£
when questioned about seeing photographs of petitioner. co~
tell0 testified at the reference hearing that petitioner's mug
shot was shown to him many times before the lineup wl1<'l·e
petitioner was identified, and "as I recollect back, there was
a little psYCllOlogy that they uscd on me by showing In(, tl,,!
picture continuously. The image of Imbler, naturally, became
imbedded in my mind, and when I saw the man in the lilH'up, it was a recollection of the picture not of the man that
had el1tprpd the store. It was a little psychologoy that tlll'~'
'Vorked." The investigating police officer admitted at the

I
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r,'fcrrnre hrnring that h(' slHHwd the photograph of petitioner from the Los Angell's Police D('partment files once to all of
the witnrsses before the lineup. lIe pres('uted it with photographs of about a dozen similar-looking men, and each of the
witnesses identified petitioner's photograph as that of the
killer.
Costello's position on this point is not clear. At the trial,
he first stated upon cross-examination that he l1ad not seen
any mug shots of petitioner before the lineup; after further
questioning, he stated that he was "not positive, but certain" that he had seen mug shots of petitioner in a mug
book before the lineup, but that he had kept his identification
to himself. At the reference hearing, Costello presented a
third version of the facts; he claimed that the police showed
mug shots of petitioner to him several times before he helped
in making the composite drawing of the killer, which closely
resembled petitioner and was admitted into evidence at the
trial.
The police denied showing any photographs of petitioner
to Costello before the drawing was completed. The composite
drawing was completed on January 18, 1961, and the Los
Angeles Police Department's files show that petitioner's file,
which presumably contained his photograph, was not released
to officers investigating the Hasson murder until January 25.
Costello testified that some of the mug shots he was shown ,
were taken by the Pomona police when petitioner turned
himself in for the January 14 robbery attempt, but the
Pomona photographs were not taken until January 17, and
the investigating officer from the Los Angeles Police Department testified that he did not receive them until January 20
and never showed them to any of the witnesses. Moreover, it
appears that petitioner first came to the attention of the Los
Angell's police as a suspect whcn an officer who had talked to
him when he turned himself in for the Pomona robbery saw a
resemblance between him and the completed composite drawing. It therefore appears that petitioner's photograph was
not shown to Costello before the composite drawing was
made. 1
IAn officer of the Vernon Police Department, called by the State to
demonstrate Costello's certainty as to his id~nt.ifir.ation, testified tli:tt
between January 10 and January 15, 1961, Costcllo told him that he
"was able to sclect one pifture of an individual who was the sll"peet or
who did the shooting in this particular case" and thnt he "was very
Bure about it." In light of all of the contrary evidence, howe\"cr, the

)
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The referee found that "the witness Alfred J. Costello
was not induced by any representative of the State of Cali.
fornia to unwittingly or otlwrwise make a false identification
of Petitioner Imbler.... " The evidence supports this find.
ing and fails to establish that Costello wilfully gave false
testimony at the trial about seeing petitioner's photograph.
His testimony at the reference hearing shows that he was
confused about when he saw a photograph of petitioner and
the form of that photograph. In any event, Costello's testimony at the trial apprised the jury that he may have been
"preconditioned" to identify petitioner at the lineup.
(Compare Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 270-271 [79 S.Ct.
1173,3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 1221-1222].)
[6a] Petitioner also alleges that several times Costello
perjured himself in answering questions involving his credibility. At the trial, Costello was cross-examined about his
criminal record and testified that he had only one felony
conviction; his "make sheet," introduced at the reference
hearing, showed that in fact he had two felony cOllvictions.
Costello was also cross-examined about his commitment to
state mental hospitals. On redirect examination, he attempted
to rehabilitate himself by testifying that since the time of his
release from these hospitals, he had received degrees from the
University of California (completing a four-year course in
two years) and the University of Southern California
(receiving an "Engineer's Degree"). This statement was
established as false at the reference hearing.
[7] False testimony affecting a witness's credibility is
perjured if willfully given (People v. Barry, 63 Cal. 62, 6465; People v. Lem You, 97 Cal. 224, 226-227 [32 P. 11];
People v. Low Ying, 20 Cal.App.2d 39, 42-43 [66 P.2d 211] ),2
witness was probably confused as to the date, for he had previously
testified that he did not know the date of this conversation because of
Costello's frequent visits.
2As to Costello's trial testimony regarding his colll'ge etlul'ation, the
referee found "that the foregoing false testimony does not constitute
perjury as defined by the Penal Code of the State of California (§§ 118,
125) in that said testimony was not given as to any fact material to the
essential issues iJlYolved in the trial of Petitioner Imbler." (~o finding
was made as to Costello's trial testimony regarding the number of his
felony convictions.) False testimony concernir.g the credibility of a witnesll is material, however, and may be the basis of a conviction for
perjury. (People v. Barry, supra; People v. Lem You, supra; People v.
Low Yi1lg, supra.) Arguably, Costello's educational achievements are
technieally immaterial to show rehabilitation from insanity, but in a
perjury case, "the ordinary test of materiality is whether the testimon1
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and such testimony would require that the conviction be
overturned if repres(>lltntives of the state had knowledge of
its false nature and if it might have affected the outcome of
the trial (see Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-270 [79
S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217]; People v. Savvidcs, 1 N.Y.2d
554,557 [154 N.Y.S.2d 885,136 N.E.2d 853]). [6b] Petitioner, however, failed to prove knowledge of these falsehoods by
representatives of the state. No evidence was introduced at the
reference hearing to show that any person connected with the
prosecution knew of Costello's educational background. The
prosecutor examined him about his college degrees on redirect examination only because Costello had informed him
that he had several degrees during a recess immediately after I
the cross-examination. The prosecutor had no reason to disbe- !
lieve this information, which was first given to him during
the course of the trial, and he had no duty to verify it before
using it to rehabilitate his witness. (See In re Horowitz, 33
Ca1.2d 534, 540 [203 P.2d 513].) Petitioner contends that the
prosecutor had Costello's "make sheet," which listed all of
his prior convictions, before him at the trial. The referee
found, however, that petitioner's counsel had the same
"make sheet" in his possession during the trial, yet failed to
use it to correct the false testimony. If the prosecutor is to be
charged with knowledge of the contents of the "make
sheet." so must petitioner. (Sce In re Manchestel', 33 Ca1.2d·
740, 742 [204 P.2d 881]; Taylor v. United States, 229 F.2d
826, 833-834; Green v. United States, 158 F.Supp. 804, 809;
cf. People v. Adam.~on, 34 Ca1.2d 320, 329 [210 P.2d 13] ; In
re lIlitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849,856 [221 P.2d 689].)8
given could ha ... e pro1.ably influenced the tribunal before which the cause
was being tried .... " (People v. Barry, 153 Cal.App.2d 193, 209 [314
P.2d 531]: accord People v. Di Giacomo, 193 Cal.App.2u 688, 699·700
[14 Cal.Rptr. 574]; People v. Macken, 32 Cal.App.2d 31, 41 [89 P.2d
173]; People v. Dunstan, 59 Cal.App. 574, 58-1 [211 P. 813].) This
testimony" could have prohn bl~- influenced" the jury to consider Costello rehabilitated after his capacity and competellce as a witness had been
put into question on cross-examination.
3Petitioncr also contends that Costello perjured himself on redirect
examination when he testified that his commitment to state mental hos·
pitals was "voluntary." It was established at the reference hearing
that he waE committed under section 1026 of the Penal Code when he
was found not guilty of a criminal eha rge by reason of insanity. Thus,
petitioner argues that the commitment was not voluntary. At the trial,
however, Costello apparently only meant that he voluntarily pleaded not
guilty by reason of insanity. 'rhe following question and answer appear
in the redirect examination of Costello:

566

IN BE IMBLER

[GO C.2(1

[Sa] Petitioncr cOJltcllds that the testimony given by the
police fingerprint expert at the trial was perjured. [9] If
any representative of the state connected with the prosecution either gives perjured testimony or knows that other
prosecution witnesses have perjured themsclYes, the writ will
issue. It is immaterial that the prosecuting attorney himself
did not have knowledge of the pcrjnry. (Curran v. Delaware,
259 F.2d 707, 713; see In Te De La Roi, 27 Ca1.2d 354 [164
P.2d 10] ; In Te De La Roi, 28 Ca1.2d 264 [169 P.2d 363];
PyZe v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 [63 S.Ct. 177, 87 L.Ed. 214] ; cf.
In Te Mitchell, 35 Ca1.2d 849, 855 [221 P.2d 689]. But see In
re Allen, 47 Ca1.2d 55, 59-60 [301 P .2d 577]. Compare Brady
v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87-88 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d
215,218].)
[Sb] '1'he expert testified at the trial that t11ere were two i
fingerprint fragments on the plastic razor case found in the:
pocket of the coat dropped by the killer and that Iwither was
sufficiently well defined to be assigned to anyone. At the reference 11earing, an expert produced by petitioner tpstificd
that there were three fingerprints on the razor case and that
although two were too fragmentary to identify, the third
could be identified and was definitely not petitioner's. The
police expert at the refercnce hearing at first testifiNl that
there were only two fingerprints on the case. Upon examining
his photographs of the fingerprints, he corrected himself and
stated that there were three. He repeatNl a~ai!l that all W\'1','
insufficient to identify. After being instructed on cross-examination to examine his photographs overnight, however, he
admitted the ncxt day that olle could be idelltifit·d alltl that it
was not petitioner's.
There is certainly an inconsistrncy in this pros('(mtioJl witness's testimony at the reference hearing, but it appf'ars that
he first came to the eonclusion tllat one of the fingerprints on
the razor case could be identified as not being petitioner's
during a l'l'C('SS in the hearing itself. There is no indieation
that he intentionally gave false testimony at the trial as to
the number of fingerprints or as to whether they were identi"Q. And what were the circumstances of your voluntarily committing
yourself'
"A. Well, in '46 and '47 when I was committed to Mendocino, I got
in a little trouhle with the law and I was represented by the Puhlic
Defender's Offiee at that time, and it was suggested to me that I enter
/I. plea of not rcn~onnhly-not guilty by reason of insanity, and I ,ya~
furnished a copy with the right answers to give the doctors at that time,
which rauseu me to be committe(l to Mendocino."
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---------------------------fiable. An honest error in expert opinion is not perjnry eyen
though further diligence and study might have rl'vealt'd the
(·rror. (See In re lIoll·ell. 114 Cal. 230, :?:i4 I . W 1'. l:i!l';
People v. Von Tiedeman, 120 Cal. 128, 136-1:17 [52 P. 133];
In re Lindley, 29 Ca1.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d !H8J.)
[10] Petitioner contends, however, that the fingerprint \
expert was negligent in analyzing the fingerprints and in:
testifying that they were too fragmentary to identify. He
asserts that we should now recognize that the negligent presentation of false testimony is as damaging as the knowing
use of perjured testimony and that, therefore, the judgment
should be set aside. The issue of the expert's negligence was
not presented to ~he referee; even if we assume, however,
that the expert wis negligent, his neglige nee did not depriyl'
petitioner of a fair trial. We have no doubt that negligenc('
of representatives of the state in preparing and presentin'.! a
criminal prosecution could in some cases result in a denial of
a fair trial. (See People v. Kidd, 56 Cal.2d 7i)~'. 769-"il 11\;
Cal.Rptr. 793, 366 P.2d 49] ; People v. Carter, 48 Ca12d 737.
747 [312 P.2d 665]; United States v. Heath, 147 F_Snpp.
877; ef. Kyle v. United States, 297 F.2d 507, 511; Um:terl
States v. Consolidated Laundries Corp., 291 F.~d ;():~. i'i70571.) Police investigators, however, are not infallibh'. Ilnd it
is the basic purpose of the trial to determine wl1etht'l' tIH'Y
were correct in asserting the defendant's guilt. l7llh'ss
their negligence has obstructed the defendant ill ehallenging
the case against him, it is not a ground for collateral attack.
The razor case and the fingl>rprints on it wt'r<' IlYailable to
petitioner throughout the trial for his own examination.
Moreover, proof that someOlI(' else had handled tll(' razor cas('
would not have absolved petitioner or conflieted with the
evidence against him. The tt'stimony of the polic(' expl'rt did
not interfere with the presentation of petitioner's defense,
and had petitioner considered it Il(lvantngt'olls to prl'sent
further fingerprint evidenct'. he could haw done so.
Petitioner contends that in seYcl'al instant'''s the state suppressed evidence favorable to him. Evidel1ce of suppression
of material evidenc(' has llsually bl'(,11 cOlIsi(l('l'('d in connection with a claim that the state knowingly us('d pprjured
testimony to secure a cOl1yiC'tinn. (In rc ;l/O()//I'l/, 10 Ca1.2d 1.
15 [73 P.2d 5!i4]; In re Lindley. 20 Cal.2d i()!). 722 [177
P.2d 918].) [U] ~I!)r(,o\"l'r, SIIP/ll'l'ssiol\ by t11t' shltt' of
material evi(1l'lH'c 1111>11(' dl'pri,·l's a clpf\'!Hlallt of dllt' prflc('ss
of law. (III t·c Raz/(ti.~, 35 Cal.2d [i:l2, il35 [21!J P.2d 15] j
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Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.
2d 215, 218], affirming 226 Md. 422, 427 [174 A.2d 167];
United States ex reI. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 [33
A.L.R.2d 1407].) [12] Petitioner contends that the police prevented the appearance of one witness favorable to him and
"quietly pushed" him out of Los Angeles before the trial. This
witness, James Fritz, was standing near Billy Hillen when the
killer rushed by, encouraged Hillen and Costello to stop him,
and joined Costeno in chasing him, but he did not testify at
either the preliminary hearing or the trial. The referee found
that this contention "is utterly barren of evidentiary support
in the record. I find that the record herein demonstrates that
unusual diligence was exercised by the representative of the
State of California to procure the attendance of Mr. Fritz as
a witness at the murder trial of P('titioner Imbler." The
police testified that at the tilne of trial, they were unable to
locate Fritz after a thorough search, and no one has yet been
able to find him. Moreover, petitioner's assumption that this
witness would have been favorable to the defense is doubtful
in light of the card introduced .at the hearing, signed by
Fritz at the police lineup, identifying petitioner as the killer.
[13] Petitioner contends that the police suppressed the
fact that a co-employee of petitioner was unable to identify
the coat dropped by the killer. This failure to identify the
coat was merely one of many fruitless attempts to connect
petitioner to the physical evidence in the. case. Evidence of
these failures would have been merely negative evidence of little probative value and could not have affectE'd the
outcome of the casco (See Palakiko V. Harper, 209 F.2d 75,
95; cf. United Statcs ex rel Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763,
769 [concurring opinion).)
[14] Petitioner contends that the state suppressed the
fact that investigating police knew that Costello had issued
several checks that were returned because of insufficient
funds between the killing and the trial. The referee found,
however, that "no threats of any cllaracter were made to
Costello with regard to the aforesaid worthless checks." The
evidence at the hearing shows that the police did not
consider this information significant; no charges were made
because of the issuance of these checks, and none were
ever proposed. Neither before nor at the trial did p('titioner
rt>quest discovery of any of the evidence he now claims was
snpprt>ssed. (See Brady v. Marylalld, 3i3 U.S. 8:3 [8:1
S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215]; cf. Unitra Statns v. Consoli·
dated Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563; Kyle v. United States,
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297 F.2d 507.) [15] Although representatives of the state
may not suppress substantial material evidence, they are
under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that
they learn about the case and about their witnesses.
[16] Petitioner contends that there is new evidence that
undermines the prosecution's entire case. (See In I'e Lindley,
29 Ca1.2d 709, 723 [177 P.2d 918] ; Jones v. Kentucky, 97
F.2d 335, 338; cf. Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 291 [76
S.Ct. 806, 100 L.Ed. 1178, 1188] [dissent].) Some of this new
evidence has already been mentioned: Costello's testimony at
the reference hearing that petitioner is not the man he chased
and the new expert testimony that a fingerprint found among
the personal effects of the killer is not petitioner's. Moreover,
Costello cast doubt on the testimony of the prosecution's
other witnesses by testifying that one of them was in no
position to make an identification when he saw the killer and
that the other was intoxicated. Petitioner also presented seyeral witnesses at the reference hearing to corroborate his alibi
defenses. Two additional persons testified that petitioner first
met Lingo, who was identified as one of the two men involved
in the January 4 killing, on January 14; two additional witnesses testified that they accompanied petitioner in making
the rounds of various Los Angeles taverns on the night of the
killing.
,
Much of this evidence was thoroughly discredited at the !
reference hearing. As to Costello's recanting, the referee:
found "that while the testimony of the witness Alfred J ..
Costello, given at the Reference Hearing, is ' ... impeached in
so many ways as to defy lucid presentation' ... , his testimony given at Petitioner's trial for murder is supported and
corroborated. " Thus, Costello charged that Dunlap, the
parking lot attendant who identified the killer at the trial,
was so intoxicated at the time of the crime that he could not
make an identification. This charge was rebutted by Dunlap's employer, who testified that he had never known this
witness to drink on the job although he had checked the lot
daily for three years, and by a police officer who testified that
Dunlap did not appear to have been drinking when questioned on the scene.
All of the witnesses who testified at the reference hearing
that they were with petitioner on the night of the killing
were shown on cross-examination to be uncertain of the exact
date, and some of the witnesses who testified that petitioner
first met Lingo on January 14 were impeached through prior

)
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inconsistent statements. Moreover, the testimony supporting
both of the alibis was merely cumulative to testimony at the
trial, for both of petitioner's alibis were corroborated then',
although by a close friend who was his accomplice in the
January 14 robbery attempt.
In In re Lindley, supra, 29 Ca1.2d 709, which also involved
a conviction based entirely upon identification testimony, a
new suspect was discovered after the trial and a former
autopsy surgeon testified that the victim had died of a heart
attack. We held that such new evidence did not justify relief,
and the same concI llsion must be drawn here. In this case, as
in Lindley, the new evidence "does not point unerringly to
[petitioner's] innocence," but "presents only a conflict
with the evidence which was before the jury" and "affords
only a basis for speculation or conjecture." (29 Ca1.2d at p.
724.)
Nor can a writ of coram vobis, which petitioner seeks
in the alternative, issue on the basis of this new evidence.
[17] The writ of coram vobis is essentially identical to the
writ of coram nobis except that the latter is addressed to the
court in which the petitioner was convicted. (l n re Lindley, 29 Ca1.2d 709,726 [177 P.2d 918].) [18] These writs
will be granted only if petitioner can "show that some
fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, and which if presented would have prevented the judgment." (People v. iII endez, 28 Ca1.2d 686, 688 [171 P.2d
425] ; accord, People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 255 [232 P. 457,
36 A.L.R. 1435] ; In re Lindley, sltpm, at p. 724-726; People
v. Tuthill, 32 Ca1.2d 819, 821 [198 P.2d 505].) No such showing has been made.
[19] Petitioner contends that he was denied adequate
representation by counsel because of the absence of an effective investigation in his behalf. (Compare In re Ochse, 38
Ca1.2d 230, 231 [238 P.2d 561). See ~eJlcrally Note, Right to
Aid in Addition to Oounsel for Indigent Or£minal Defendants, 47 Minn.L.Rev. 1054.) The services of the Los Angeles
Public Defender's investigative staff were available, however,
and an investigator worked on the casf'. At no time during
the trial did counsel indicate that additional investigative
services were 11{'eded or ask for additional time to conduct all
investigation. The only support for the claim that the investigation was inadequate was the fact that an investigation
after the trial by the Adult Authority and the district attor-
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ney's l'itaff turnt'd up additional alibi witnesses that the
defense had been unable to find. Wllateyer may be the seope
of the right to au equate and effecti\'e invl'stigatioll, it does
not require that the investigation produce all evidence that
can be shown by l1indsight to have been available.
.
[20] Petitioner contends finally that the trial judge erred
in informing the jury in response to a juror's qUl'stion of
petitioner's right to an automatic appeal to this court in the
event that they should impose a death penalty. The trial
court failed to admonish the jury of their sole responsibility
for imposing a sentence or to explain to them the nature and
scope of this court's revie,v. The jury was informed of the
automatic appeal only after consent of both parties had been
obtained, ho\"eyer, and this objection was not raised either at
the trial or on the appeal.
The order to show cause is discharged and the petition is
denied.
Gibson, C. J., Scllauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Peek J., concurred.
Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied December 30, 1963.

